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Responding to Crises:
A Test of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory
Courtney Wright
ABSTRACT
Crisis management includes efforts designed to prevent and to detect potential
crises, and to learn from crisis experiences. The SCCT posits that certain crisis responses
(matched) produce better outcomes for organizations than others (unmatched), depending
on the situation. In addition, the results from this study attempt to support the situational
crisis communication theory in aiding crisis managers in protecting their organizations
against crises.

v

Chapter One
Introduction
Crisis communication management is a public relations function that is
increasingly important to the achievement of organizational goals. Media coverage of
organizations facing crisis situations is abundant. During the next five years, 83 percent
of companies will face a crisis that will negatively impact the profitability of the
company by 20 to 30 percent, according to new research by Oxford-Metrica, an
independent adviser on risk, value, reputation and governance (Aon, 2006). For instance,
the 1989 Exxon Valdez crisis cost the company billions. It is estimated that some Exxon
station sales decreased by 30 percent. The company saw a drop of 43 percent from its
1988 profits as a result of the oil spill. In addition, the net income per share also
decreased from $1.06 to $.37 (Small, 1991).
An organization may encounter a variety of crisis situations. According to
Pearson and Clair (1998), a plethora of potential crises exist, including corporate
misdeeds, product tampering, and environmental and natural disasters, to name a few.
The Institute for Crisis Management states that crisis-prone industries include
medical/surgical manufacturers, software manufacturers, pharmaceutical manufacturers,
telecommunication companies, computer manufacturers, commercial banks, solid waste
disposal companies, security and commodity brokers, life insurance companies, and the
airline industry. Therefore, effective crisis management is important to a broad range of
organizations.
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Background
A review of literature indicates that minimal attention has been devoted to crisis
management theory. According to Coombs (2008), theory development in crisis
communication is behind general public relations theory development because this
specialized area of inquiry is still in its theoretical infancy, despite its importance in
practice. This is supported by Seegar, Sellnow, and Ulmer (1998), who found a lack of
theory-based approaches in reviews of crisis communication literature. Crisis
communication has created a large body of practical research, but scant theory has
emerged (Coombs, 2007).
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to further current theory-driven research in public
relations by examining the perception of the effect crisis management strategies have on
organizational reputation, crisis responsibility, and potential supportive behavior of an
organization. Specifically, this study seeks to test the situational crisis communication
theory to determine its ability to predict effective crisis response strategies.
Crisis Defined
To better understand the current state of crisis management research, it is
necessary to review the development of this area of public relations scholarship. To date,
scholars have developed commonalities regarding crisis situations that are used to define
the concept. For example, Fearn-Banks (1996) defines a crisis as “a major occurrence
with a potentially negative outcome affecting an organization, company, or industry, as
well as its publics, products, services, or good name” (p. 1). Sociologist R.L. Hamblin
(1958) argues a crisis is “…an urgent situation in which all group members face a
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common threat” (p. 322). According to Pauchant and Mitroff (1992), a crisis is “a
disruption that physically affects a system as a whole and threatens its basic assumptions,
its subjective sense of self, its existential core” (p. 12). Fink (1986) claims a crisis is any
event that may escalate in intensity; fall under close media and government scrutiny,
interfere with normal business operations, and may affect the image and bottom line of a
company. In 1993, Barton stated that a crisis “[was] a major, unpredictable event that has
potentially negative results. The event and its aftermath may significantly damage an
organization and its employees, products, services, financial condition, and reputation”
(p. 2). Lerbinger (1997) defines a crisis as “an event that brings, or has the potential for
bringing, an organization into disrepute and imperils its future profitability, growth, and
possibly its very survival” (p. 4). Finally, Pearson and Clair (1998) view a crisis as “a
low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the organization and is
characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a
belief that decisions must be made swiftly” (p. 60).
Even though these definitions are slightly different, a closer examination reveals
numerous similarities. According to King (2002), a crisis has three primary
characteristics. First, a crisis is an unplanned event that has the potential to dismantle the
internal and external structure of an organization. Second, a crisis can occur at any time.
Finally, a crisis has the potential to affect the legitimacy of an organization. The media
can influence public perception in regards to issues involving cause, blame, response,
resolution, and consequences. When an organization is presented in a negative light, its
legitimacy may be threatened (King, 2002; Ray, 1999).
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Once an organization is presented in a negative light, the probability of the
organization surviving the crisis is dramatically reduced. Fearn-Banks (1996)
emphasizes, in her seminal work on crisis communication, the need for organizations to
develop and implement effective crisis management and communication plans.
This study attempts to contribute to the current theory-driven research in crisis
communication by examining crisis response strategies from a communication-centered
perspective. Specifically, this study seeks to further understanding of crisis
communication by examining the effect of a crisis when a matched or unmatched
response strategy is used by an organization facing a crisis due to an accident. The crisis
type as well as the strategy used in this study is derived from Coombs’ situational crisis
communication theory. This theory and its origins will be introduced and discussed in
the following literature review.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review
What is to be communicated and by whom within an organization are important
factors in crisis communication. Crisis communication is “the communication between
the organization and its publics prior to, during, and after the negative occurrence”
(Fearn-Banks, 1996, p. 2; King, 2002). This definition of crisis communication will be
the referenced definition throughout this study. However, in the next paragraph, several
versions of the definition will be provided to show different perspectives. During the
communication phase, the organization must appear to be in control to members external
to the [organization] (Heath, 1994; King, 2002). Such behavior will direct stakeholders’
physical and psychological responses, as well as impressions about the organization
(King, 2002; Ray, 1999). To do this, crisis managers may use an array of response
strategies, which will be discussed later in the chapter.
Crisis Communication and Crisis Management
Crisis management differs from crisis communication in the fact that it represents
a “systematic attempt by organizational members with external stakeholders to avert
crises or to effectively manage those that do occur” (Pearson & Clair, 1998). In this case,
the organization and members of the crisis management team attempt to remove some of
the risk and uncertainty that would not allow the organization to be in control of its own
destiny (Fearn-Banks, 1996; King, 2002). In addition, the crisis management team must
decide what issues must be addressed within a crisis plan. Constructing a crisis
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management plan may be difficult due to the situational characteristics of a crisis and its
many changing variables.
Effective crisis communication management is difficult to achieve since each
crisis is different from the next. What an organization says and does once a crisis begins
(the crisis response) can have a significant effect on the success of the crisis management
effort (Benoit, 1997; Coombs, 1999). Researchers have just begun to explore the
dynamics of the crisis response process (Benoit, 1995, 1997; Coombs & Holladay, 1996).
The next section explores crisis communication management from seminal work
when few crisis responses were documented and made available to crisis managers to the
development and testing of crisis response strategies and their effectiveness in achieving
organizational goals.
Crisis Communication Management in the Beginning
Crisis communication management, in public relations research, has lagged in
research and theory development (Coombs, 2006). Although, according to Coombs
(2007), crisis communication management is considered a subset of public relations,
tactics of public relations are used to disseminate information to the appropriate
stakeholders and publics during a crisis, thus, qualifying crisis communication
management as a form of public relations.
Up until the incidents of the Johnson & Johnson and the Exxon cases, pre-crisis
management had been deemed symbolic because, for too many years, crisis
communication research was simply practitioner truisms and tales from the field: “What
I did during our crisis” (Coombs, 2006). However, these two crises provided benchmarks
in crisis communication management research on what to do and what not to do during a
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crisis and how to prevent it from happening again. Due to their influence on the
development of crisis communication theory, these two seminal cases are briefly
reviewed in the following section to clearly portray what happens when a crisis is
handled properly and when a crisis is handled poorly.
Johnson & Johnson Tylenol Case. In 1982, some Tylenol capsules were found
laced with cyanide in the Chicago area. This product tampering resulted in seven deaths.
To this day, the identity of the person or persons who committed the Tylenol product
tampering is still unknown. All supplies of the product in stores nationwide were pulled
off the shelves by Johnson & Johnson, at a cost of $50 million. After due time and
investigation, the product was reissued in tamper-resistant containers, and a sealed
package of capsules was offered free to consumers who had discarded the suspect
supplies in their possession (Center & Jackson, 2003).
During the aftershock of the crisis, Tylenol miraculously recovered the market
share it held prior to the crisis. Despite initial losses, the company was able to regain its
credibility and reestablish public trust. As a result, Johnson & Johnson set the benchmark
for successful crisis management. The question that needs to be answered now is how
was Johnson & Johnson able to gain the market and its image and reputation back after a
tumultuous crisis such as the cyanide-laced capsules? The phrase, “no good deed goes
unpunished,” holds true to Johnson & Johnson because the standards that the company
holds itself to were the pillars of its success in handling the crisis. The following factors,
according to Center and Jackson (2003), are the main reasons Johnson & Johnson came
out on top:
1. “The company benefited from a long history of success and service in a field of

“beneficial” and “worthwhile” healthcare products.”
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2. “Johnson & Johnson took pride in its public visibility and its reputation for
3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

integrity.”
“The company benefited by having had a strong founder who believed that “the
corporation should be socially responsible, with responsibilities to society that
went far beyond the usual sales and profit motives (Baker, 1993). Johnson &
Johnson, basically, set high standards for itself to set a distinguishing tradition
that shall be continued as long as the company is in business.”
“There was a credo, a “For this we stand” on paper, which succeeding generations
of executives have built and interpreted in terms of changing times an challenges.
The credo was brought out during the crisis for the world to see.”
“In its relations with employees, neighbors, investors, customers, and government
agencies, there was a candor consistent with competitive and financial security.
Company spokespeople – including the CEO – showed leadership and authority.”
“There was a recognition of the public interest and its legitimate representation by
news media. Information, whether good or bad, was forth coming as rapidly as it
developed.”
“The corporate public relations function was part of the management,
participating in the decision process and in the implementation when
communication was involved.”
“There were mechanisms for feedback from constituent publics, and a high value
was placed on public input” (Center & Jackson, 2003, p. 187).

Johnson & Johnson’s success in crisis management stands in sharp contrast to the
example set by the Exxon Corporation.
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Case. It was supposed to be a routine trip from the Prince
William Sound to Long Beach, California for the Exxon Valdez, a 987-foot oil tanker.
The tanker, commanded by Captain Joseph Hazelwood, was “longer than three football
fields, [and] loaded to the top with enough oil to fill the Rose Bowl almost halfway to the
top” (Turning Point, 1994).
Unfortunately, the Exxon Valdez never made its destination to Long Beach
because on March 24, 1989, the oil tanker ran aground the Bligh Reef in Prince William
Sound, Alaska. The Exxon Valdez spilled 240,000 barrels (10 million gallons) of oil into
the water. The oil slick was 10 feet wide, four miles long, and eventually covered 1,300
8

miles of shoreline. An estimated 2 million animals died as a result, including 1 million
migratory fowl, a third of the sea otter population, and numerous seals and sea lions.
This estimate does not include the number of clams and fish on whom Alaskan fishermen
depend for their livelihood (Fearn-Banks, 2007).
However, the real crisis mishap occurred when Exxon refused to take
responsibility for the crisis. Exxon blamed anyone and/or anything from the captain of
the Exxon Valdez to the out-of-date radar of the U.S. Coast Guard. In the wake of the
crisis, Exxon blamed the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, U.S. Coast Guard, the
Alaskan government, weather, and the Department of Environmental Conservation. The
giant conglomerate also went as far as to blame the captain, Joseph Hazelwood, and the
third mate, Gregory Cousins, because reports came out that Hazelwood was intoxicated
during the incident and handed over the responsibility of the ship to an inexperienced
Cousins (Fearn-Banks, 2007).
The then-CEO of Exxon, Lawrence G. Rawl, was one of the last people to
communicate about the crisis when he should have been the first. Unlike Tylenol, Exxon
did not have a strategic chain of command to handle the crisis. In the wake of the spill,
rather than Rawl becoming the spokesperson like a CEO should, Frank Iarossi, thenpresident of Exxon shipping, was the main representative at the Valdez site (FearnBanks, 2007). There was no presence of remorse from the top executives. It took Rawl
10 days to formally issue a response to the public, which came in the form of an open
letter.
During the initial response to clean-up the spill, Exxon barely participated in any
efforts in containing and cleaning the crisis. Atlantic Richfield (ARCO), British
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Petroleum (BP), and five other companies initially participated in the response. Exxon
soon after took over the clean-up efforts from the other companies (Fearn-Banks, 2007).
Information about the crisis was disseminated poorly. Iarossi did not keep
Exxon’s publics informed and when he did make a statement, the information turned out
to be erroneous the majority of the time.
It is important to understand why the cases of Tylenol and Exxon Valdez are
important to crisis communication management. During a time of scant crisis
communication study, these cases showed how a crisis can be handled in a successfully
orchestrated manner, with positive organizational outcomes, or how a poor inappropriate
organizational response can result in significant negative outcomes for an organization.
With the occurrences of the Tylenol and Exxon Valdez cases, crisis communication
management spawned into a more strategic study of how to handle crises to achieve more
positive organizational outcomes. Through the years, crisis communication has started a
slow transition from “What I did during our crisis” to a more theoretical approach to
handling a crisis. Out of theory came the situational crisis communication theory that
posits a crisis response taxonomy.
Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT)
Crisis management includes efforts designed to prevent and to detect potential
crises, and to learn from crisis experiences (Caponigro, 2000; Cohn, 2000; Coombs,
1999b; Mitroff, 2001). Moreover, crisis management has emphasized post-crisis
communication and the use of crisis response strategies – what organizational leaders say
and do after a crisis hits (Coombs, 2007). Integrated with Benoit’s (1995) image
restoration and Hearit’s (1994) corporate apologia, the situational crisis communications
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theory (SCCT) model attempts to map out post-crisis communication. More specifically,
the model illustrates how crisis response strategies can be used to protect reputational
assets after the presentation of instructing information, which is the first communication
priority in a crisis (Sturges, 1994). According to Bergman (1994), Coombs (1998), and
Sturges (1994), the SCCT attempts to explain the type of information that instructs
stakeholders what to do to protect themselves from the crisis, the basics of what
happened, and what the organization is doing to fix the situation and to prevent a
recurrence of the problem.
For any crisis, compassion should be the primary response strategy that
organizations contemplate when the source of the crisis is uncertain. Compassion is
suggested as the answer to any crisis where fault is unknown because some crises
produce victims and victims place unique demands on crisis managers (Ogrizek &
Guiller, 1999). Expressing compassion involves acknowledging and expressing
sympathy for victims without accepting responsibility or stating remorse in order to avoid
litigation issues. Legal expert, J. Cohen (1999), supports the recommendation that
compassion be used when fault is unclear. Most accidents and product recalls (either
human or technical error) have unclear fault at the onset of the crisis and may take weeks
or months to clarify (Ray, 1999).
According to Coombs (2007), the SCCT posits that the crisis situation determines
which crisis response strategies will be most effective in protecting the organization’s
reputation. Reputational assets are important to an organization and are threatened by a
crisis. It follows that crisis managers should try to maximize the reputational protection
afforded by using appropriate crisis response strategies.
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Historical Development of SCCT
The SCCT has been the focus of numerous studies over the past (Coombs, 2007).
To fully understand the development of the SCCT, it is important to understand the
theoretical perspectives of Benoit’s Image Repair Discourse and Hearit’s apologia which
have informed the growth of the SCCT.
Benoit’s Image Repair Discourse. When people, groups, and organizations are
accused of objectionable behavior, reputations can be damaged (Benoit & Brinson,
1999). An organization’s image, or reputation, is a valuable asset that represents trust,
loyalty, and responsibility granted to an organization. In other words, when an
organization fails to live up to its promises and expectations, negative consequences can
occur for consumers, ranging from inconvenience to death. Whenever an organization is
faced with a crisis that tarnishes its image, a domino effect of events starts to occur.
When one crisis happens in an organization, customers immediately begin to become
skeptical of how they use or buy that organization’s products or services. After that
initial shock of crisis, a domino effect, of sorts, starts to occur. An [organization’s]
image could influence how closely the government regulates its actions. Reputation can
influence the price of a company’s stock. It can even influence how other companies
deal with it (e.g., terms offered for loans or credit; how long a supplier is willing to wait
for payment or how much of a discount will be offered on a purchase) (Benoit & Pang,
2007). Thus, whether an organization be large or small, it is important for it to
continuously maintain and portray a positive image.
Crises and threats that have the potential to disrupt or tarnish an organization’s
image are constantly threatening organizations today. Some organizations are may face
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several crises in a day, but they are never heard of because of their low threat level.
However, it is the major crises that make it past the stakeholders and into the media that
many organizations dread each day. That is why it is so true when Pinsdorf (1987)
acknowledged that public relations crises “are no longer a matter of if, but when; no
longer the exception, but the expected – even the inevitable” (p. 37). This proactive
stance has led many companies to take extensive measures of crisis prevention and image
preservation. This section explicates the theory of image repair discourse, which
provides the foundation for the situation crisis communication theory’s (SCCT) responses
to organizational crisis. However, we will begin with developing and understanding
messages used to respond to corporate image crises.
To completely understand the theory, it is important to define image. Image is
nothing but a symbolic thought that is created in one’s mind about a representation of a
certain feeling or object. However, in the realm of corporate image, a corporation’s
image is a subjective impression of that business held by other people. A corporation’s
(or person’s or organization’s) image, or reputation, is subjective because it arises from
the information held by people about that corporation. Our perceptions of an
organization (or person or group) are formed from the words and deeds of that
organization – and from what others say and do about that organization. So, in a much
abridged version, an image is a subjective impression of an organization formed through
one’s experience with that organization and interpreted are based on other past
experiences (Benoit & Pang, 2007, pp. 244-245).
Benoit and Pang (2007) also implied that an image is a subjective impression that
will vary from one person to another. It is unlikely that two people will have identical
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experiences. Furthermore, even if they did have the exact same experiences with a given
organization, their other unique experiences are likely to dominate their own
interpretations of the information they share about the organization. Other people will
often have similar impressions of an organization, but it is unlikely that any two people
will have precisely the same impression of an organization where some people, of course,
will have widely disparate impressions of a firm. So, more than likely, different people
can be expected to have different images of a given corporation (Moffitt, 1994).
The image restoration literature is heavy on description and retrospective sensemaking through case studies, whereas it is short on predictive value and causal inferences
(Coombs & Schmidt, 2000). Scientific evidence demands the process of comparison.
The knowledge gained from a one-shot case study is generally illusory (Campbell &
Stanley, 1963).
Image restoration analysts tend to generate a list of image restoration strategies
employed in the case and then speculate on how these strategies promoted success or
failure of an image restoration effort (Coombs & Schmidt, 2000). According to Coombs
and Schmidt (2000), the typical image restoration analysis provides limited insight into
how publics reacted to the strategies and the actual effect of the strategies on the
organizational image. These limits preclude (a) developing precise additions to the body
of knowledge and (b) allowing crisis managers to draw from the full benefits that image
restoration theory has to offer crisis communication.
In 2000, Coombs and Schmidt, made it aware that; to understand how publics
react to different image restoration strategies in different types of crises if crisis managers
are to learn when certain response strategies should be used or avoided, we must become
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more prescriptive so that crisis managers have clearer guidelines for selecting their image
restoration strategies. In other words, for crisis managers to help organizations protect
their image during a crisis, it is urgent for an organization to present a clear picture of the
organization’s current image to its stakeholders for crisis managers to provide
organizations with concise information on how to continuously and actively preserve the
organization’s image. To do this, Coombs and Schmidt (2000) suggested that there are at
least two options for developing more exact prescriptive knowledge. The first option is
to execute a series of similar case studies. Using a series of similar case studies would
allow the researcher to find patterns that would indicate the effect of specific strategies in
a particular type of crisis. For example, a number of collapsed mines crises and the
image restoration strategies that were used could be examined. If a specific strategy is
associated with successful crisis management, then it is safe to assume that that strategy
should be used in other collapsed mines crises. We can be more confident in the
implications of a case study if a number of case studies are conducted and a pattern of
similar results emerge (Coombs & Schmidt, 2000).
The second option is to empirically examine the effect of various strategies that
were employed in a crisis case. Coombs and Schmidt (2000) suggested testable research
that could come out of the descriptive list of strategies identified in a case study to
determine their true effects on publics. Respondents can read or view videotapes of the
image response strategies and complete surveys designed to assess their reactions to the
strategies. The claims made about the effects of strategies are tested to see if they hold
true. The researcher controls the image response strategies by exposing respondents to
different strategies and then measuring their reactions for comparisons. The empirical
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tests are another way of moving from speculation to knowledge (Coombs & Schmidt,
2000).
Analysis of image repair discourse suggests that there are many points of views in
understanding and influencing images. For the most part, our image of a company is
based on what we have seen, heard, and read about that [organization] (Benoit & Pang,
2007). The way a stakeholder perceives a particular organization depends on how that
organization communicates to the stakeholder, which, in turns produces an image or
impression of that organization. Other points of views that strongly influence how we
look at an organization’s image are through the words and actions of other people. This
means an image can be influenced (and threatened or damaged) by the accusations,
complaints, and behavior of others (Benoit & Pang, 2007). And when an organization’s
image is susceptible to being damaged, it is critical for that organization to take the
necessary precautions to prevent a potential image distortion or take immediate action in
repairing image.
According to Benoit and Pang (2007), observing that an image is an impression
also means that an image may be at odds with reality. This can be harmful to an
organization because even though a particular situation may not seem like a threat to an
organization, an organization that was or is currently perceived in a negative light may
experience a biased perception. Reality and image, combined, can cause major problems
for an organization because perception can be more important than reality and this is
where image repair discourse meets communication. In a 2007 article, Benoit and Pang
stated that [a] company inappropriately accused of wrongdoing must use communication
to correct this mistaken image. They added that sometimes people see what they want to
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see and fail to see what they do not want to see. The truth can repair an image, but if the
relevant audience refuses to accept the truth, reality cannot help the unfairly damaged
image. So image and image repair both arise from reality but must be shaped through
communication. Furthermore, reality clearly influences images, but rarely do people
have a complete knowledge of the facts, and what they do know is filtered or interpreted
by their personal attitudes and experiences (Benoit & Pang, 2007).
Image repair discourse does not pertain solely to organizations, but discourse may
also be implemented with individuals as well. Even though organizations have better
resources than individuals to repair their image, the basic options are the same for both
individual and corporate image repair efforts (Benoit & Pang, 2007). To really protect a
brand, a corporate official, at times, must act as an individual to reach out to stakeholders
rather than speak for the organization all of the time. Thus, writing on both corporate and
individual image repair can be useful.
Image Repair Theory and Crisis Management. Benoit (2007) and his colleagues
have developed the theory of image repair discourse and applied it in a variety of
contexts: corporate (Benoit 1995a, 1995b; 1998; Benoit & Brinson, 1999; Benoit &
Czerwinski, 1997; Benoit & Hirson, 2001; Benoit & Pang, 2007; Blaney, Benoit, &
Brazeal, 2002; Brinson & Benoit, 1996); political (Benoit 1995a, 1999; Benoit, Gullifor
& Panici, 1991; Benoit & McHale, 1999; Benoit & Nill, 1998a; Benoit & Pang, 2007;
Benoit & Wells, 1998; Kennedy & Benoit, 1997; Len-Rios & Benoit, 2004); international
(Benoit & Brinson, 1999; Benoit & Pang, 2007; Drumheller & Benoit, 2004; Zhang &
Benoit, 2004; Zhang & Benoit, in press); and other contexts (Benoit, 1997a; Benoit &
Anderson, 1996; Benoit & Hanczor, 1994; Benoit & Nill, 1998b; Benoit & Pang, 2007;
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Blaney & Benoit, 1997-2001). The next section explains the relationship of image repair
discourse and crisis communication.
As stated by Benoit and Pang (2007), images [can] be threatened when another
person obtains information that creates an unfavorable impression about another person
or organization and when images are damaged undeservedly. An organization runs a
great risk of its image becoming tarnished when an organization is falsely accused of a
crisis in a malicious manner, whether it be in disregard of the truth or by mistake.
Threats to image that are not based in reality can be just as damaging as threats arising
from the accused’s harmful actions (Benoit & Pang, 2007). And this is when
communication is important to crisis management and image repair discourse. It is with
communication that we are successful in repairing false accusations.
Another philosophy that should be followed when dealing with image repair
theory is that image, and threat to image, arise from the perceptions of the audience
(Benoit & Pang, 2007). This philosophy allows that one person can have a totally
different perception of a situation than that of the person standing next to them. That is
why it is crucial to take different perspectives into account when dealing with image
restoration. Benoit and Pang (2007) were lead to another important observation: It is
vital to realize that businesses frequently must deal with several audiences. Identification
of the key audience or audiences is important because different audiences often have
diverse interests, concerns, and goals (Benoit & Pang, 2007). When a crisis
communicator has preserved an organization’s image amongst their diverse stakeholders,
Hearit’s apologia should be incorporated with the image repair discourse to provide the
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proper message that should be disseminated amongst the stakeholders to preserve the
established positive image of the organization.
Hearit’s Apologia. It is important to understand that when apologia is used by an
organization, it does not necessarily mean that an organization is apologizing for its
actions in a crisis by accepting full responsibility. The organization’s effort may deny,
explain, or apologize for the action through communication discourse (Fearn-Banks,
2007).
Corporate apologia has been deployed for decades by organizations when dealing
with organizational crises. This next section will define apologia as well as explicate its
conceptual fundamentals.
The first theoretical framework for apologia was introduced in an essay by Ware
and Linkugel (1973). During their research and studies of apologia, Ware and Linkugel
(1973), observed four factors and four postures used in apologetic speaking. These
factors and postures, which will be discussed next, were discovered in social scientific
research on the resolution of belief dilemmas, mastered by Abelson (1959.
The first identified factor, denial, occurs when one denies “alleged facts,
sentiments, objects, or relationships” (Ware & Linkugel, 1973, p. 275). The second
factor is bolstering, which is the obverse of denial because denial involves negation and
bolstering involves identification. “Bolstering refers to any rhetorical strategy which
reinforces the existence of a fact, sentiment, object, or relationship” (p. 277). The
“speaker attempts to identify [themselves] with something viewed favorably by the
audience” (p. 277). Denial and bolstering are known as reformative strategies because
they “do not attempt to change the audience’s meaning or affect for whatever is in
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question” (pp. 275-276); they “simply revise or amend the cognitions of the audience” (p.
276).
The third factor is differentiation, which serves “the purpose of separating some
fact, sentiment, object, or relationship from some larger context within which the
audience presently views that attribute” (Ware & Linkugel, p. 278). The fourth factor,
transcendence, is the obverse of differentiation because whereas differentiation moves
toward the less abstract, transcendence moves toward the more abstract. Transcendence
“cognitively joins some fact, sentiment, object or relationship with some larger context
within which the audience does not presently view that attribute” (p. 280).
Differentiation and transcendence are transformative strategies that involve a change in
meaning.
When the factors for apologia were identified and described, Ware and Linkugel
(1973) identified the four postures that apologetic speakers can refer to: absolution,
vindication, explanation, and justification. Each of these postures involves the
combination of one transformative factor with one reformative factor. The first posture is
absolution, which results from the union of the differentiation and denial factors and it “is
one in which the speaker seeks acquittal” (p. 282). Vindication, the second posture,
involves denial and transcendence and “aims not only at the preservation of the accused’s
reputation, but also at the recognition of his grater worth as a human being relative to the
worth of his accusers” (p. 283). The third posture is explanation, which combines
bolstering and differentiation. “In the explanative address, the speaker assumes that if the
audience understands his motives, actions, beliefs, or whatever, they will be unable to
condemn him” (p. 283). The fourth posture is justification, which occurs when bolstering
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and transcendence are joined. Justification “asks not only for understanding, but also for
approval” (p. 283).
Although the exigencies for apologia are ethical in nature, Hoff (1980) notes that
management should ask if the corporation did something wrong. Is there a need to justify
or defend an action?
SCCT’s Current Articulation
The situational crisis communication theory was developed after J.A. Benson
(1998) challenged the crisis communication field to support his theory that there are a set
number of crisis types and crisis response strategies. The SCCT matches each crisis to its
most appropriate response strategy. Coombs (2007) stated that meaningful matching is
possible only if there is some correspondence/link between crisis types and crisis
response strategies. To create this link, SCCT drew from attribution theory and
neoinstitutional theory, which are reviewed below.
Attribution Theory. This theory is a useful framework for explaining the relation
between a situation and the selection of communication strategies (Coombs & Holladay,
1996). Research demonstrates that people search for causes of events in a variety of
domains (Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988). McAuley, Duncan and Russell (1992)
identified four causal dimensions people might use when making attribution: stability,
external control, personal control, and locus. Stability assesses if the event’s cause
happens frequently (stable) or infrequently (unstable). External control indicates whether
or not the event’s cause is controllable. Personal control assesses whether or not the
event’s cause is controllable by the actor. Locus reflects if the event’s cause is something
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about the actor or something about the situation (McAuley et al., 1992; Russell, 1982;
Wilson, 1993).
Research indicates a substantial overlap between personal control and locus
(Coombs & Holladay, 1996). Wilson (1993) suggests that the two causal dimensions be
taken as one dimension that reflects intentionality of an act. When both are high in an
actor, perceptions of intentional actions are created, while unintentional actions are
created when both are low in an actor. Although measures have been developed for four
dimensions (McAuley et al., 1992), functionally there are three causal dimensions:
stability, external control, and locus/personal control (locus, for short).
The judgments people make about these three causal dimensions influence their
feelings and behaviors toward the actor (Weiner, 1985; Weiner et al., 1988; Wilson et al.,
1993). People’s attributions to an event can be changed in two ways depending on
explanations given by the actors. First, the messages can shape how people perceive the
three attribution dimensions. Second, the messages can affect the feelings created by the
attributions (Weiner et al., 1988). People make attributions about an organization for a
crisis when they determine the cause of the crisis. Greater attributions of responsibility
lead to stronger feelings of anger and a more negative view of an actor’s image (Weiner,
Amirhan, Folkes, & Verette, 1987).
The three causal dimensions of attribution should affect evaluations of
organizational responsibility for a crisis in predictable ways (Coombs & Holladay, 1996).
According to Coombs and Holladay (1996), organizational crisis responsibility should be
perceived as strongest if the cause is stable (i.e., the organization has a history of crisis),
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external control (controlled by others outside the organization) is low, and the locus is
strongly internal (unintentionality is high).
Coombs and Holladay (1996) also stipulate that when a crisis event is repeated
(stable), publics are more likely to attribute responsibility to the organization. Moreover,
attributions of low external control indicate that the crisis was not under the control of
groups outside of the organization; thus, the crisis should not be attributed to external
agents. Attributions that entail a strong internal locus/intentionality suggest that the
organization could have done something to prevent the crisis (Coombs & Holladay,
1996). This type of attribution suggests that the organization knew what to do to prevent
the crisis and any steps needed to contain it.
Coombs and Holladay (1996) stated that organizational crisis responsibility
should be weakest when attributions suggest the cause is unstable (i.e., the crisis is an
exception in the organization’s performance history), with strong external control and
weak internal locus (low intentionality). Attributions, as found by Coombs and Holladay
(1996), reflecting strong external control and low intentionality (weak internal locus)
suggest that factors outside the organization and its control are responsible for the crisis
event. An unstable crisis creates weak attributions of organization responsibility
(Coombs & Holladay, 1996), such as when circumstances are beyond the organization’s
control and the crisis cannot be prevented.
One objective of crisis management is to prevent or lessen reputational damage to
an organization (Barton, 1993; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993; Sturges, 1994). According to
Coombs and Holladay (1996), attributions of organizational crisis responsibility should
precipitate reputational damage. If communication can alter public’s causal attributions
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or affect feelings generated by these attributions, crisis response strategies can be used to
reduce reputational damage.
Neoinstitutionalism Theory. An organization is granted legitimacy if stakeholders
believe an organization is good and/or has a right to continue operations (Allen &
Cailouet, 1994; Bedeian, 1989). Legitimacy is critical to the successful operation of an
organization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) because it is a conformation of social rules and
expectations established by stakeholders. On the contrary, when crises occur,
stakeholders question the organization’s ability to conform to the stakeholder’s rules and
expectations. In turn, this questions an organization’s legitimacy. An organization will
use communication strategically as a response to legitimacy threats because corporate
discourse does shape how stakeholders view an organization (Allen & Caillouet, 1994;
Marcus & Goodman, 1991).
The crisis response strategy can be used to a) show the challenge is invalid or b)
attempt to get stakeholders to judge the crisis more mildly and evaluate the organization
more positively (Allen & Caillouet, 1994). From the neoinstitutional perspective,
organizations should favor the use of crisis response strategies that reflect efforts to reestablish legitimacy (Coombs & Holladay, 1996). “Neoinstitutional research consistently
indicates corporate actors use mechanisms and procedures to convey conformity with
their institutional environment to enhance legitimacy and survival chances” (Allen &
Caillouet, 1994, p. 48).
Coombs and Holladay (1996) argue that organizations must shift the focus from
the violation of social norms (the crisis) to efforts designed to repair the violation
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because, if a crisis cannot be shown to be invalid, crisis managers should use strategies
that show how the organization has returned to the norms held by its stakeholders.
Attribution and neoinstitutional theories provide the framework for the SCCT,
which is organized into three parts: the crisis situation, crisis response strategies, and the
matching recommendations (Coombs, 2007).
The Crisis Situation
A crisis situation will generate particular attributions of crisis responsibilities or
the degree to which the organization is perceived to be responsible for the crisis event
(Coombs, 2007). According to Coombs (2007), the level of crisis responsibility is a
primary indicator of how much a threat the crisis is to the organization’s reputation and
what crisis response strategies are necessary to address that threat. The crisis situation
basically involves crisis types and threat intensifiers. Threat intensifiers will be discussed
and described shortly, however, crisis types simply provide categories for crises. Each
crisis type is different in that it situationally provokes different stakeholder views and
evaluation of responsibility. Each crisis type will generate a specific level of crisis
responsibility. The SCCT is built on a taxonomy of thirteen crisis types, which have
been divided into three clusters (Coombs, 2007). Each of the crisis types in a cluster
shares a similar level of crisis responsibility with the others (Coombs & Holladay, 2002).
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Crisis types by level of crisis responsibility
Attributions of crisis responsibility, high: Preventable cluster
Human breakdown accidents: Human error causes an industrial accident.
Human breakdown recalls: Human error causes a product to be recalled.
Organizational misdeed with no injuries: Stakeholders are deceived without injury.
Organizational misdeed management misconduct: Laws are regulations are violated by
management.
Organizational misdeed with injuries: Stakeholders are placed at risk by

management and injuries occur.
Attributions of crisis responsibilities, moderate: Accidental cluster
Challenges: Stakeholders claim an organization is operating in an inappropriate manner.
Megadamage: A technical accident where the focus is on the environmental damage
from the accident.
Technical breakdown accidents: A technology or equipment failure causes an

industrial accident.
Technical breakdown recalls: A technology or equipment failure causes a product

to be recalled.
Attributions of crisis responsibilities, low: Victim cluster
Natural disaster: Acts of nature that damage an organization, such as an earthquake.
Rumors: False and damaging information about an organization is being circulated.
Workplace violence: Current or former employee attacks current employees onsite.
Product tampering/malevolence: External agent causes damage to an organization.

FIGURE 1

From “The Development of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory,” by T.
Coombs, 2007. In T. L. Hansen-Horn and B. D. Neff (Ed.), Public Relations: From Theory to Practice
(pp. 262-277). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.

Threat intensifiers strengthen the reputation damage a crisis can cause on an
organization and include crisis history, relationship history, and severity (Coombs, 2007).
Coombs (2007) defines the threat intensifiers as follows: Crisis history includes similar
crises an organization has had in the past. News stories often include reports if an
organization has experienced similar crises. Relationship history indicates if the
organization has had a record of good works or bad behavior. Relationship history is
concerned with how the organization has treated its stakeholders in the past.
Organizational behavior is a key factor in determining reputations. Stakeholders feel it is
important for an organization’s words and deeds to match (Herbig, Milewicz, & Golden,
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1994). Together, crisis and relationship history are known as performance history
because they are indicators of how the organization has acted in the past. Severity is the
amount of damage inflicted by the crisis, including injuries, loss of lives, financial loss,
and environmental destruction.
If an organization has a negative crisis history, negative relationship history,
and/or the crisis damage is severe, the reputational damage of the crisis type is intensified
(Coombs, 2007). As seen in Table 1, the crisis types are divided into three clusters based
on similar, initial attributions of crisis responsibility: preventable, accidental, and victim.
It is suggested, that if a crisis intensifies, it should move a crisis type to the next level.
According to Coombs’ (2007), the threat intensifiers indicate what crisis response
strategy is appropriate.
According to Blazer and Sulsky (1992), a favorable relationship history should
produce a halo effect, acting as a shield that protects the organization from the
reputational damage of a crisis. So, a favorable pre-crisis relationship with stakeholders
should benefit an organization (Birch, 1994; Fearn-Banks, 1996; Siomkos & Shrivastava,
1993). When a positive relationship is established with stakeholders, a crisis that sheds
negative light on an organization or when the cause of a crisis is still unknown, the
attributions of the crisis responsibility and the organization’s reputation will be affected
for a more positive outcome for the organization.
Crisis Response Strategies
In its current form, the SCCT includes 10 crisis response strategies, grouped into
three postures. A posture represents a set of strategies that share similar communicative
goals and vary in terms of their focus on protecting the crisis victims (victim orientation)
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and taking responsibility for the crisis (Coombs, 2007). It is important to understand that
the key word that links crisis types and crisis response strategies is responsibility. The
attribution and neoinstitutional theoretical concepts are reflected in the three postures that
represent the three basic communicative options.
Crisis response strategies by postures
Deny posture (low concern for victim and responsibility acceptance)
Attack the accuser: Crisis manager confronts the person or group claiming something is
wrong with the organization.
Denial: Crisis manger claims that there is no crisis.
Scapegoat: Crisis manger blames some person or group outside the organization for the
crisis.
Diminish posture
Excuse: Crisis manger minimizes organization responsibility by denying intent to do
harm and/or claiming inability to control the events that triggered the crisis.
Justification: Crisis manager minimizes the perceived damage caused by the crisis.
Deal posture (high concern for victim and responsibility acceptance)
Ingratiation: Crisis manager praises stakeholders and/or reminds them of past good
works by the organization.
Concern: Crisis manger expresses concern for the victims.
Compensation: Crisis manager offers money or other gifts to victims.
Regret: Crisis manager indicates the organization feels bad about the crisis.
Apology: Crisis manager indicates the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis
and asks stakeholders for forgiveness.

FIGURE 2

From “The Development of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory,” by T.
Coombs, 2007. In T. L. Hansen-Horn and B. D. Neff (Ed.), Public Relations: From Theory to Practice
(pp. 262-277). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.

According to Coombs (2007), the deny posture represents a set of strategies that
claim no crisis occurred or that the accused organization has no responsibility for the
crisis. If there is no crisis, there can be no organizational responsibility for a crisis
(attribution theory) and no violation of legitimacy (neoinstitutional theory). The diminish
posture reflects a set of strategies that attempt to alter stakeholder attributions by
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reframing how stakeholders should interpret the crisis (attribution theory). Crisis
managers might try to place distance between the organization and the crisis, thereby
seeking to reduce responsibility for the crisis. The deal posture represents a set of
strategies that seek to improve the organization’s reputation in some way. By protecting
victims and accepting responsibility, crisis managers encourage stakeholders to judge the
organization more positively or less negatively. An organization in an intentional crisis is
expected to address victim concerns, so the crisis response strategy must demonstrate the
organization is meeting expectations/adhering to social norms, which is a tenant of
neoinstitutional theory.
The deal posture includes the concern strategy that is an expression of
compassion. Although automatically used when there are victims, the concern strategy is
optional when no one seems to be harmed. Moreover, the grouping shows that an
expression of concern is viewed very similarly to apology and regret, which are the two
crisis response strategies that can open an organization to legal liability.
Modeling the Process
To obtain a better understanding of the relationship between variables, the SCCT
is shown in model form.
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Situational Crisis Communication Theory model

FIGURE 3

From “The Development of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory,” by T.
Coombs, 2007. In T. L. Hansen-Horn and B. D. Neff (Ed.), Public Relations: From Theory to Practice
(pp. 262-277). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.

The relationships are based on the propositions below (Coombs, 2007, pp. 268-269).
1. Organizational reputation proposition: There is a strong, negative correlation
between organizational reputation and crisis responsibility. Attributions of crisis
responsibility have a strong effect on perceptions of organizational reputation.
The stronger the attribution of crisis responsibility, the more the crisis can damage
the organizational reputation and, in turn, affect future interactions with the
organization (potential supportive behavior).
2. Potential supportive behavior proposition: A strong, positive correlation exists
between organizational reputation and potential supportive behavior, intentions to
engage in acts that would help an organization. A negative reputation should
result in less supportive behavior from stakeholders, while a positive reputation
should engender more.
3. Severity proposition: Severity has a significant intensifying effect on crisis
responsibility and damage to organization reputation. As the crisis increases in
severity (inflicts greater damage), attributions of crisis responsibility will
intensify. Severity of an incident tends to increase perceptions of responsibility
among individuals. The same dynamic is believed to hold true for organizations
in crisis. Severity is also an indication of deviation from the norm. Greater
severity suggests a greater violation of the expected norms and could result in
direct damage to the organization’s reputation.
4. Crisis history proposition: An unfavorable crisis history has a significant
intensifying effect on crisis responsibility and damage to organizational
reputation. Organizations that have experienced similar crises in the past will be
attributed greater crisis responsibility and suffer more direct reputational damage
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than an organization with no history of crises. The history of crises indicates that
the crisis is part of a pattern of behavior by the organization, another negative act
by the organization and not an anomaly.
5. Relationship history proposition A: An unfavorable relationship history has a
significant intensifying effect on crisis responsibility and damage to the
organizational reputation. An organization that has treated stakeholders badly in
the past will be attributed greater crisis responsibility and suffer more direct
reputational damage than an organization with a neutral or positive relationship
history.
6. Relationship history proposition B: a favorable relationship history has a
significant reducing effect on crisis responsibility and damage to the
organizational reputation.
Organizations that have maintained favorable
relationships with stakeholders will see weak attributions of crisis responsibility
and less reputational damage for a crisis than those with neutral or unfavorable
ones.
7. Crisis response strategy selection proposition: Organizations will suffer less
reputational damage from a crisis and experience greater potential supportive
behavior if they match the crisis response strategy to the reputational threat of the
crisis. See Figure 4 for a list of general recommendations. These propositions
emulate how SCCT forms a relationship between crisis situations and crisis
response strategies.
List of crisis response recommendations
Rumor: Use any of the denial strategies.
Natural disaster: Use instructing information.
Workplace violence: Use instructing information.
Product tampering: Use instructing information.
Product recall, technical error, megadamage; and Accidents, technical error: Use excuse and/or
justification.
History, relationship history, and/or severe damage: Use any of the deal strategies.
Product recall, human error and accidents, human error: Use any of the deal strategies.
Organizational misdeeds: Use any of the deal strategies.
When victims occur: Use the concern crisis response strategy in combination with other
recommended strategy (ies).
FIGURE 4
From “The Development of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory,” by T.
Coombs, 2007. In T. L. Hansen-Horn and B. D. Neff (Ed.), Public Relations: From Theory to Practice
(pp. 262-277). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.
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Matching Crisis Situations to Crisis Response Strategies and Limitations
The SCCT maintains that as attributions of crisis responsibilities and/or the threat
of reputational damage increases, crisis managers must use crisis response strategies that
reflect a greater concern for victims and take more responsibility for the crisis (Coombs,
2007). Figure 4 provides a list of crisis response recommendations to serve as guidelines
provided by the SCCT. For example, a low organizational crisis such as a technical-error
would require nothing more than an excuse to justify the error. However, if the same
error keeps occurring, crisis managers would have to implement strategies from the deal
posture because stakeholders may look at the crisis as something that is preventable
rather than an accidental technical error. Coombs (2007) argues that the concern crisis
response strategy should be applied to any crisis with victims to express compassion.
Like any other developing theory, the SCCT has its limitations. It posits that by
matching the proper crisis type to the proper crisis response strategy, an optimum
solution will be achieved in resolving a crisis. However, Coombs (2007) states that legal
and/or financial liabilities can restrict what an organization can and cannot say and
sometimes organizations may become inoperable if such heavy liabilities are taken by an
organization. Apologies, and in some states expression of regret, will result in significant
legal liabilities and financial costs (France, 2002). In order to lessen an organization’s
liability for a crisis, many crisis managers use a less effective diminish strategy. SCCT
allows crisis managers to understand the effect of choosing a nonmatching strategy by
indicating why the effectiveness of the response is reduced (Coombs, 2007).
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Terminological Changes. Since its appearance on a flowchart in 1995, SCCT has
gone through many changes, terminologically and technically. The historical
development can be divided into terminological changes, research-driven, and theory
testing (Coombs, 2007).
The ‘S’ in the acronym SCCT, stands for situational. However, when the theory
was first introduced, the “S” stood for symbolic. The term symbolic was chosen because
the crisis response strategies were viewed as symbolic resources that could be employed
during a crisis because words are symbols, hence, crisis response strategies were
symbolic resources (Coombs, 2007). Later, many researchers thought the term symbolic
to be problematic because the word symbolic represents a type of action and nothing
substantive. Eventually, symbolic was replaced with situational because the theory is
premised on the crisis situation (Coombs, 2007).
The threat intensifiers began as modifiers. However, research showed that
negative performance histories drove the effect of the modifiers, termed the Velcro effect
(Coombs & Holladay, 2001). Coombs (2007) found that negative performance history
served to intensify the attributions of crisis responsibility and the damage to the
organizational reputation, so the name was changed. Another notable change was that
the names technical error and human error of the crisis type category evolved from
technical breakdown and human breakdown. It was observed that breakdown was too
cumbersome and error captured the essence of the crisis types more parsimoniously
(Coombs, 2007).
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Research-Driven Changes. Perhaps the most substantive growth of the SCCT
was the change in representation of crisis types on a continuum rather than a grid. The
information entered in the grid was easily entered. However, when all information was in
its proper place, the grid of information did very little to explain the effects of the crisis
types. Originally, crisis types were viewed as a 2-by-2 grid representing personal control
(whether the organization could control the source of the crisis) and external control
(whether an external agent was in control of the source of the crisis) (Coombs, 1995;
Coombs, Hazleton, Holladay, & Chandler, 1995). However, research has found that
external control contributes little to the explanation of variance for SCCT (Coombs,
2007).
In the early development of SCCT, it was thought that crisis responsibility was
predicted by personal control. However, later research showed that personal control and
crisis responsibility were essentially the same variable (Coombs & Holladay, 2001,
2002). Personal control and crisis responsibility were later combined together to form
one category.
Testing the SCCT
To test SCCT, measures were developed to test the central concepts of
organizational reputation, crisis responsibility, and potential supportive behavior. The
organizational reputation concept was derived from McCroskey’s (1966) measure of
character (trust and past and current conceptualizations of reputation). His original
model had 10-items, but was later scaled down to five items and still held its reliability
range of .80 to .92.
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Crisis responsibility was measured by using two types of scales: McAuley,
Duncan, and Russell’s (1992) Causal Dimension Scale II (CDSII) and Griffin, Babin, and
Darden’s (1992) blame scale. The Causal Dimension Scale II, or CDSII, assesses
attributions of controllability of an even while the blame scale assesses who is
responsible for the event. While the scales went through wording and evaluative
modifications to fit the mold of the organization (Coombs & Holladay, 2002), the final
seven-item scale demonstrated reliabilities similar to that of the organizational reputation
measure with a range of .80 to .91.
The potential supportive behavior measure is the only scale that was developed
from scratch by Coombs. The idea of this measure is to find out how a stakeholder might
act toward an organization after a crisis and if people intend to behave in ways that are
favorable to the organization after the crisis (Coombs, 2007). The potential supportive
behavior scale demonstrated reliabilities between .81 to .87.
Out of all of the scales, organizational reputation has been the most extensively
tested. According to Coombs (2007), five students have found a significant negative
correlation between crisis responsibility and organization reputation. The average
correlation across these studies r = -.415. The correlations were found across the entire
range of crisis types, including organization misdeeds, human-error accidents, technical
errors accidents, technical-error recalls, workplace violence, and product tampering
(Coombs, 1998, 1999a; Coombs & Holladay, 2001, 2002; Coombs & Schmidt, 2000).
Three studies used organizational misdeeds, human-error crisis, technical-error
crisis, workplace violence, product tampering, and technical-error recall to test the crisis
history proposition. Crisis history was found to have a significant effect on organization
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reputation for all but the technical-error recall and a significant effect on crisis
responsibility for all but product tampering and technical-error recall (Coombs, 1998,
2002b; Coombs & Holladay, 2001). This finding was termed the Velcro effect, as the
unfavorable condition attracted and snagged additional reputational damage (Coombs &
Holladay, 2002).
A human-error accident crisis was used to test the relationship history
propositions of the theory. The results stipulate that the unfavorable relationships history
was found to have a significant effect on organizational reputation and crisis
responsibility which showed its support for A. On the contrary, however, B was not
supported because a favorable relationships history was no different than having no
relationship history (Coombs, 2007). As with a crisis history, a Velcro effect was
observed; only the negative condition had an effect (Coombs & Holladay, 2001).
The severity proposition was tested in one study using technical-error accident
and organizational misdeed crisis types. The results indicated that severity of the crisis
damage did not affect either organizational reputation or crisis responsibility as
anticipated (Coombs, 1998).
The potential supportive behavior proposition has been examined in two studies
using organizational misdeed and human-error accident crisis types. Organizational
reputation, r=.37, and potential supportive behavior correlated, r=.48.
The crisis response strategy selection proposition was tested in two studies using
organizational misdeed and technical-error accident crisis types. According to the studies
conducted, the matched strategies (those recommended by SCCT) performed better than
the mismatched strategies. The SCCT matches each crisis to its most appropriate
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response strategy. Coombs (2007) stated that meaningful matching is possible only if
there is some correspondence/link between crisis types and crisis response strategies
`while the mismatched conditions included using responses that accepted greater
responsibility than recommended by SCCT, to prevent finding an effect by simply using
lower, less-effective crisis response strategies (Coombs & Holladay, 1996; Coombs &
Schmidt, 2000).
Purpose and Hypotheses
This study attempts to contribute to current theory-driven research in crisis
communication by examining crisis response strategies from a communication-centered
perspective. Specifically, this study seeks to further understanding of situational crisis
communication theory by examining the effect of crisis response strategies on public
perceptions of an organization in an accident crisis situation. To accomplish this
objective, three hypotheses were developed.
H1:

In an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational response
message will produce a more positive perception of organizational
reputation than an unmatched organizational response strategy.

H2:

In an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational response
message will produce a more positive perceptions of crisis
responsibility for an organization than an unmatched
organizational response strategy.

H3:

In an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational response
message will produce a more positive potential supportive
behavior than an unmatched organizational response strategy.

It is a primary goal of this study to learn more about the effectiveness of crisis
response strategies in producing the desired outcome for organizations in crisis. This
study seeks to test the propositions of the situational crisis communication theory and
identify the message strategies most effective in producing positive public perceptions of
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organizational reputation, crisis responsibility, and potential supportive behavior of
publics toward an organization in crisis, specifically an accident. To the test the proposed
hypotheses, the methodology section will provide, in detail, how each hypotheses will be
tested.
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Chapter Three
Methodology
Research Participants
The participants for this study were 90 undergraduate students enrolled in an
introductory mass communication class at a large southeastern university. Crises produce
unique forms of publics for organizations, victims, and nonvictims. Victims are those
who are directly affected in some way (e.g., evacuated from an area, injured physically,
or lost property). The focus of this present study is on nonvictims. Nonvictims are not
affected by the crisis but follow the crisis in the news media because they are part of the
organization where the possible crisis could occur. The students fit the parameters of the
nonvictim population because they share the characteristics of being directly associated
with an organization where a possible crisis could occur and they hold strong perceptions
of the organization prior to a possible crisis.
Of the participants, 63.3% were female (n=57) and 36.7% were male (n=33). The
respondents ranged in age from 18 to 40 years old (M=19.93, SD=2.96).
Design and Materials
The Campbell & Stanley one-shot case study (intervention and post-test) required
the development of one scenario. A limitation of this design can occur when treatments
are not randomized, however, treatments were randomized in this study to address this
limitation. One response to one particular crisis was developed for the study. The
matched response had the organization taking full responsibility of the crisis and
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conveying an apologetic response to its stakeholders. An accident was selected for the
crisis type for two reasons. First, accidents are a common type of crisis (Irvine & Miller,
1996). The results of applied research are more beneficial when they address issues that
have a direct impact on someone and/or something. The lessons are more valuable when
they can be applied more frequently. Second, accidents provide a greater variance in
perceptions (Coombs & Holladay, 2001). Accidents vary in terms of the perceptions
formed about the crisis and the organization in crisis. For instance, technical breakdowns
and workplace violence produce minimal perceptions of crisis responsibilities, whereas
human error produces fairly stronger perceptions of crisis responsibilities (Coombs,
1999a). Even though there are ways to help in the prevention of accidents, stakeholders
can perceive accidents very differently. That is why it is important to utilize a crisis type
that demonstrates variance on many of the perceptual variables used in a study.
Instrumentation
For this study, a hypothetical crisis was developed based on a possible crisis
situation that could have potential serious repercussions for stakeholders if ever this crisis
occurred. In this case, the budget cuts that are affecting all public universities in Florida,
especially the University of South Florida and the USF School of Mass Communications,
is expected to reduce many of its communications class offerings. As a result, students
would be required to participate in random drawings for the classes they need.
Regardless of tenure, all students are entered into the drawing equally. Depending on
how some student’s names are randomly selected, this process has the potential to
dramatically delay student’s course work which means more money and more time spent
at the university because there is not enough faculty to teach all of the classes needed to
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accommodate all of the students. The following message was used as the matched
response:
“For the first time in 35 years, Florida is experiencing a severe
economic downturn, resulting in a drop in tax collection and a decrease of
the amount of state money available to State University System
Institutions, i.e., USF. The budget cut strips the University of
approximately $51 million or 15% of our overall budget. Because of these
large budget cuts, the university has to reduce many of its current course
offerings because the university is not able to employ enough faculty to
accommodate current students. Unfortunately, many courses at USF will
be part of a new course enrollment process.
This new course enrollment process enters student’s names into a
lottery for needed courses. Names will be selected randomly until each
course is full. Due to the overwhelming number of students and limited
course availability, all students are entered into the drawing equally,
regardless of academic level or area of study.
It is important to understand that USF’s overall concern is to our
students. The school has always made it a priority to accommodate its
students and your overall collegiate success. We know how this budget
cut is going to dramatically disturb a large number of your graduation
plans and USF is fully committed to doing whatever is necessary so that
this will not happen. USF may have to limit the number of new students
and/or eliminate some programs, but your graduation and academic plans
will not be affected by this economic crisis. If you have any questions or
concerns, please do not hesitate to contact myself or my staff.”
The next message shows the unmatched response that was used in the
instrumentation:
For the first time in 35 years, Florida is experiencing a severe economic
downturn, resulting in a drop in tax collection and a decrease of the
amount of state money available to State University System Institutions,
i.e., USF. The budget cut strips the University of approximately $51
million or 15% of our overall budget. Because of these large budget cuts,
the university has to reduce many of its current course offerings because
the university is not able to employ enough faculty to accommodate
current students. Unfortunately, many courses at USF will be part of a
new course enrollment process.
This new course enrollment process enters student’s names into a
lottery for needed courses. Names will be selected randomly until each
course is full. Due to the overwhelming number of students and limited
course availability, all students are entered into the drawing equally,
regardless of academic level or area of study. More information about this
course enrollment system will be announced in late November.
41

This experimental design involved the manipulation of crisis history for the
scenario. Three scales were employed to test the dependent variables in the study: (a)
organizational reputation, (b) crisis responsibility, (c), potential supportive behavior.
Organizational Reputation. Organizational reputation was measured using five
items from Coombs and Holladay’s (1996) 10-item Organizational Reputation Scale,
which is an adaptation of McCroskey’s (1966) scale for measuring ethos. Specifically,
an adaptation of the Character subscale of McCroskey’s Ethos Scale was used to assess
organization reputation (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). In this instance, character is used
as a trustworthiness and good will of the source, that is, an assessment of the degree to
which USF is concerned about its students. McCroskey’s items were modified by simply
replacing the term speaker with USF. The five items used in the present study were: (a)
“USF is concerned with the well-being of its publics,” (b) “USF is honest and open to its
publics,” (c) “I trust USF to be honest and open about the situation,” (d) “Under most
circumstances, I would be likely to believe what USF says,” (e) “USF is not concerned
with the well-being of its students.”
Crisis Responsibility. Crisis responsibility was measured using Griffin, Babin,
and Darden’s (1992) three-item scale for blame. In this measure, organization was
replaced with the term USF. The three items were: (a) “Circumstances, not USF, are
responsible for the crisis,” (b) “The blame for the crisis lies with USF,” (c) “The blame
for the crisis lies in the circumstances, not USF.”
Potential Supportive Behavior. This final measurement was adapted from a
Coombs (1999a) 8-item scale comprised of a list of actions an organization might ask
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stakeholders to perform. However, the scale was modified into a 5-item version that used
two items from the original scale where the term organization was replaced with USF.
The items are: (a) “I intend to say nice things about USF to other people” and (b) “I
intend to call or email my state government officials to voice my concern on this crisis
that is affecting USF.” The last three items were specifically developed for this
experiment. The items are: (c) “I plan to continue my college education at USF,” (d)
“intend to support USF’s administrative decision,” and (e) “I plan to transfer to another
academic institution to complete my degree.”
Procedures
Each respondent received a packet containing a cover page with instructions, one
stimulus crisis case, and a copy of the survey instrument. The order of the materials in
the packet was 1) a cover page, 2) a stimulus, and 3) a copy of the survey instrument.
Each respondent read the stimulus and completed the survey instrument accordingly.
Respondents were verbally instructed to read carefully each case and then respond to the
questions following the case. The administration required about 10 to 15 minutes.
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Chapter Four
Results
This study attempts to contribute to current theory-driven research in crisis
communication by examining crisis response strategies from a communication-centered
perspective. Specifically, this study seeks to further understanding of situational crisis
communication theory by examining the effect of crisis response strategies on public
perceptions of an organization in an accident crisis situation. To accomplish this
objective, three hypotheses were developed.
H1:

In an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational response
message will produce a more positive perception of organizational
reputation than an unmatched organizational response strategy.

H2:

In an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational response
message will produce a more positive perceptions of crisis
responsibility for an organization than an unmatched
organizational response strategy.

H3:

In an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational response
message will produce more positive potential supportive behavior
than an unmatched organizational response strategy.

Study of Participants
To test the hypotheses posited by this study, a 1x2 factoral experiment was
conducted. The experiment utilized a balanced design that included 90 college students
enrolled at a large southeastern university. The participants included 33 males and 57
males. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 40, with an average age of 19.93 years.
Table 1 presents the frequencies and percentages of the sex and academic year of the
participants.
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Table 1. Sex and academic year of participants
Variable
Frequency
Sex
male
33
female
57
Year

freshman
sophomore
junior
senior

37
18
32
3

Percentage
36.7
63.3
41.1
20.0
35.6
3.3

Measures of Variables of Interest
Prior to the hypotheses testing, the internal consistency of the multi-item scales
used to test the variables of interest was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha to find the
reliability coefficients. The five items included to test organizational reputation produced
a reliability coefficient of .79. The three items included to test crisis responsibility
produced a reliability coefficient of .86. The four items included to test organizational
control produced a reliability coefficient of .78. Five items were included to test
supportive behavior, and the alpha indicated scale reliability by dropping the item “I
intend to call or email my state government officials to voice my concern on this crisis
that is affecting USF.” After this item was omitted, the four remaining items produced a
reliability coefficient of .87.
Overall, the Cronbach’s alpha scores, shown in Table 2, indicate reliability for
the multi-item scales used to measure the variables of interest. According to Berman
(2002), alpha values between .80 and 1.00 indicate high reliability. It is also agreed that
the lower limit of .70 is still a useful measure of constructs (Broom & Dozier, 1990;
Stacks, 2002).
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Table 2. Cronbach’s alpha for multiple-item indexes
Variable
α
Organizational Reputation
.79
Crisis Responsibility
.86
Organizational Control
.78
Supportive Behavior
.87

Number of items
5
3
4
4

Next, an evaluation of means for each variable of interest was performed prior to
creating composite measures for hypothesis testing. An evaluation of the items used to
measure organizational reputation produced mean scores ranging from 3.34 to 3.80. The
mean and standard deviation for each item used to measure organizational reputation is
shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Organizational Reputation descriptives
Variable
N
1orgrep1
90
2orgrep2
90
3orgrep3
90
4orgrep4
90
5orgrep5
90

Mean
3.31
3.80
3.34
3.51
3.46

Std. Deviation
.830
.914
1.007
.890
.950

An evaluation of the items used to measure crisis responsibility produced mean
scores ranging from 2.30 to 2.54. The mean and standard deviation for each item used to
measure crisis responsibility is shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Crisis Responsibility descriptive
Variable
N
6cr1
90
7cr2
90
8cr3
90

Mean
2.54
2.30
2.30

Std. Deviation
.996
.854
.893

An evaluation of the items used to measure organizational control produced mean
scores ranging from 2.49 to 2.72. The mean and standard deviation for each item used to
measure organizational control is shown in Table 5.

46

Table 5. Organizational Control descriptive
Variable
N
9oc1
90
10oc2
90
11oc3
90
12oc4
90

Mean
2.49
2.50
2.72
2.53

Std. Deviation
1.063
1.008
1.017
.877

An evaluation of the items used to measure potential supportive behavior
produced mean scores ranging from 2.61 to 3.80. The mean and standard deviation for
each item used to measure potential supportive behavior is shown in Table 6.
Table 6. Potential Supportive Behavior descriptive
Variable
N
Mean
13sb1
90
3.80
14sb2
90
3.67
15sb3
90
3.06
16sb4
90
3.39
18sb5
90
2.61

Std. Deviation
1.210
1.122
1.193
1.371
.991

An evaluation of the items used to measure overall effectiveness produced mean
scores ranging from 2.46 to 2.50. The mean and standard deviation for each item used to
measure overall effectiveness is shown in Table 7.
Table 7. Overall Effectiveness descriptive
Variable
N
19eff1
90
20eff2
90
21eff3
90

Mean
2.48
2.46
2.50

Std. Deviation
.951
1.007
1.030

Finally, items used to measure each variable of interest were collapsed into
composite measures for each variable. The mean scores for the composite measures
ranged from 2.38 to 3.48. The mean and standard deviation for the composite measures
are shown in Table 8.
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Table 8. Mean and standard deviation for composite measures
Composite Measure
N
Mean
Organizational Reputation
90
3.48
Crisis Responsibility
90
2.38
Organizational Control
90
2.56
Potential Supportive
90
3.48
Behavior
Overall Effectiveness
90
2.51

Std. Deviation
.678
.808
.767
1.041
.812

Test of Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 posited that in an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational
response message will produce a more positive perception of organizational reputation
that an unmatched organizational response strategy. To test this hypothesis, an
independent-samples t- test was conducted. The results indicated that an unmatched
response (N=45, M=3.57, SD=.692) produced a higher mean score than the predicted
matched response (N=45, M=3.40, SD=.65). However, the difference in means was not
significant, t (88) = -.506, p = .793. These results indicate the matched response does not
yield a more positive perception of organizational reputation; therefore H1 is not
supported.
Hypothesis 2 posited that in an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational
response will produce more positive perceptions of crisis responsibility for an
organization than an unmatched organizational response strategy. To test this hypothesis,
an independent-samples t-test was conducted as well. The results indicated that a
matched response (N=45, M=2.45, SD=.832) produced a higher mean score than an
unmatched response (N=45, M=2.31, SD=.786) as initially predicted. However, the
difference in means was not significant, t (88) = -.527, p = .691. These results indicate
that the matched response yielded a more positive perception of crisis responsibility;
therefore H2 is not supported.
48

Hypothesis 3 posited that a matched organizational response message will
produce more positive potential supportive behavior than an unmatched organization
response strategy. An independent-samples t-test was also used to test this hypothesis.
The results stipulated that an unmatched response (N=45, M=3.55, SD=.997) produced a
higher mean score than the predicted matched response (N=45, M=3.41, SD=1.09).
However, the difference in means was not significant, t (88) = -1.129, p = .417. These
results indicate that the matched response yielded a more positive perception of crisis
responsibility; therefore H3 in not supported.
Exploration of Individual Item Differences
Following the hypothesis testing, exploration analysis was conducted to determine
if significant differences existed between the matched and unmatched crisis responses for
each individual item. Table 9 shows the mean and standard deviation for each item used
to measure the variables of interest in this study.

Table 9. Individual item mean and standard deviation
Crisis Type
1 Org ReP:
“USF is concerned

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

matched

45

3.27

.837

unmatched

45

3.36

.830

matched

45

3.71

.920

unmatched

45

3.89

.910

matched

45

3.20

1.014

unmatched

45

3.49

.991

with the wellbeing of its
publics”
2 Org Rep:
“USF is basically
dishonest”
3 Org Rep:
“I do NOT trust
USF to tell the
truth about the
incident”
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4 Org Rep:

matched

45

3.40

.863

unmatched

45

3.62

.912

5 Org Rep:

matched

45

3.40

.889

“USF is not

unmatched

45

3.51

1.014

matched

45

2.49

1.014

unmatched

45

2.60

.986

matched

45

2.47

.919

unmatched

45

2.13

.757

matched

45

2.40

.915

unmatched

45

2.20

.869

matched

45

2.31

.973

unmatched

45

2.67

1.128

“Under most
circumstances, I
would be likely to
believe what USF
says”

concerned with the
well-being of its
students”
6 CR:
“Under most
circumstances, I
would be likely to
believe what USF
says”
7 CR:
“The blame for the
crisis lies with
USF”
8 CR:
“The blame for the
crisis lies in the
circumstances, not
USF”

9 OC:
“The cause of the
crisis was
something that
USF could
control”
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10 OC:
“The cause of the

matched

45

2.42

1.011

unmatched

45

2.58

1.011

matched

45

2.67

1.066

unmatched

45

2.78

.974

matched

45

2.60

.939

unmatched

45

2.47

.815

matched

45

3.80

1.254

unmatched

45

3.80

1.179

matched

45

3.53

1.160

unmatched

45

3.80

1.079

matched

45

2.93

1.195

unmatched

45

3.18

1.193

matched

45

3.36

1.464

unmatched

45

3.42

1.288

crisis is something
over which USF
had no power”
11 OC:
“The cause of the
crisis is something
that was
manageable by
USF”
12 OC:
“The cause of the
crisis is something
over which USF
had power”
13 SB:
“I plan to continue
my college
education at USF”
14 SB:
“I intend to say
nice things about
USF to other
people”
15 SB:
“I intend to
support USF’s
administrative
decision”
16 SB:
“I plan to transfer
to another
academic
institution to
complete my
degree”
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17 SB:
“I intend to call or

matched

45

3.31

1.427

unmatched

45

2.56

1.324

matched

45

2.69

.973

unmatched

45

2.53

1.014

matched

45

2.44

.893

unmatched

45

2.51

1.014

matched

45

2.49

1.079

unmatched

45

2.42

.941

matched

45

2.38

1.072

unmatched

45

2.62

.984

email my state
government
officials to voice
my concern on this
crisis that is
affecting USF”
18 EFF:
“I am satisfied
by the way USF
has managed this
crisis”
19 EFF:
“I believe that
USF’s response to
this crisis is
effective”
20 EFF:
“I do not believe
USF has handled
this crisis as well
as it could have”
21 EFF:
“I am comfortable
that USF
responded to the
crisis in a manner
that
accommodated to
the student’s best
interest.”

Separate independent samples t-tests were conducted on each item to determine if
any of the mean scores for the matched and unmatched crisis responses were significantly
different. Only the item, “I intend to call or email my state government officials to voice
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my concern on this crisis that is affecting USF,” indicated a significant different between
matched (N=45, M=3.31, SD=1.43) and unmatched (N=45, M=2.56, SD=1.32)
responses. The Results are shown in Table 10.

Table 10. Independent Sample t-tests
Levene's Test for Equality
of Variances

1 Org ReP*:
“USF is concerned with

Equal variances

t-test for Equality of Means

F

Sig.

t

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

.069

.793

-.506

88

.614

-.506

87.994

.614

-.922

88

.359

-.922

87.990

.359

-1.367

88

.175

-1.367

87.957

.175

-1.187

88

.238

-1.187

87.740

.238

-.553

88

.582

-.553

86.527

.582

assumed

the well-being of its
publics”

Equal variances not
assumed

2 Org Rep*:
“USF is basically
dishonest”

Equal variances

.119

.731

assumed
Equal variances not
assumed

3 Org Rep*:
“I do NOT trust USF to

Equal variances

.029

.866

assumed

tell the truth about the
incident”

Equal variances not
assumed

4 Org Rep*:

Equal variances

“Under most

assumed

.131

.719

circumstances, I would be Equal variances not
likely to believe what
assumed
USF says”
5 Org Rep*:
“USF is not concerned
with the well-being of its
students”

Equal variances

1.834

.179

assumed
Equal variances not
assumed
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6 CR*:
“Under most

Equal variances

.159

.691

-.527

88

.600

-.527

87.932

.600

1.878

88

.064

1.878

84.862

.064

1.064

88

.290

1.064

87.768

.290

-1.601

88

.113

-1.601

86.138

.113

-.730

88

.467

-.730

88.000

.467

-.516

88

.607

-.516

87.299

.607

.719

88

.474

.719

86.280

.474

.000

88

1.000

.000

87.670

1.000

assumed

circumstances, I would be Equal variances not
likely to believe what
assumed
USF says”
7 CR*:
“The blame for the crisis
lies with USF”

Equal variances

4.989

.028

assumed
Equal variances not
assumed

8 CR*:

Equal variances

“The blame for the crisis

assumed

lies in the circumstances,

Equal variances not

not USF”
9 OC*:

Equal variances
assumed

was something that USF

Equal variances not

10 OC*:
“The cause of the crisis is
something over which
USF had no power”
11 OC*:
The cause of the crisis is
something that was
manageable by USF”
12 OC*:
“The cause of the crisis is
something over which
USF had power”

13 SB*:
“I plan to continue my

.274

assumed

“The cause of the crisis

could control”

1.213

1.803

.183

assumed
Equal variances

.018

.893

assumed
Equal variances not
assumed
Equal variances

1.517

.221

assumed
Equal variances not
assumed
Equal variances

.738

.393

assumed
Equal variances not
assumed

Equal variances

.066

.798

assumed

college education at USF” Equal variances not
assumed
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14 SB*:

Equal variances

“I intend to say nice
things about USF to other

Equal variances not
assumed

15 SB*:

Equal variances

administrative decision”

.417

-1.129

88

.262

-1.129

87.540

.262

-.971

88

.334

-.971

88.000

.334

-.229

88

.819

-.229

86.592

.819

2.604

88

.011

2.604

87.506

.011

.743

88

.460

.743

87.853

.460

-.331

88

.741

-.331

86.622

.741

.312

88

.756

.312

86.403

.756

assumed

people”

“I intend to support USF’s

.665

.180

.672

assumed
Equal variances not
assumed

16 SB*:

Equal variances

“I plan to transfer to
another academic
institution to complete my

1.627

.205

assumed
Equal variances not
assumed

degree”
17 SB*:

Equal variances

“I intend to call or email

.642

.425

assumed

my state government

Equal variances not

officials to voice my

assumed

concern on this crisis that
is affecting USF”
18 EFF*:

Equal variances

“I am satisfied by the

assumed

way USF has managed

Equal variances not

this crisis”

.029

.866

assumed

19 EFF*:

Equal variances

“I believe that USF’s

assumed

1.143

.288

response to this crisis is
effective”

Equal variances not
assumed

20 EFF*:
“I do not believe USF has

Equal variances

.448

.505

assumed

handled this crisis as well
as it could have”

Equal variances not
assumed
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21 EFF*:

Equal variances

“I am comfortable

.250

.618

-1.127

88

.263

-1.127

87.356

.263

assumed

that USF responded Equal variances not
to the crisis in a
assumed
manner that
accommodated to
the student’s best
interest.”

*Org Rep = Organizational Reputation; CR = Crisis Responsibility; OC = Organizational Control; SB = Potential
Supportive Behavior; EFF = Overall Effectiveness

Each of the hypotheses and the meaning of the corresponding results will be
discussed in the following chapter. From the examination, conclusions are formed and
recommendations are offered for future research.
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Chapter Five
Discussion
This study examined the situational crisis communication theory to test if the
theory would preserve an organization’s reputation in the wake of a crisis. The SCCT
offers a set of principles that guide the selection of the crisis response strategies in order
to maximize reputational protection (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). SCCT provides crisis
managers with guidelines for understanding which response strategies are most
appropriate for a given crisis type (Coombs, 1995). In an attempt to contribute to the
development and refinement of the SCCT, three hypotheses were tested in this study.
H1, which states that in an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational
response message will produce a more positive perception of organizational reputation
than an unmatched organizational response strategy, was not supported by the results of
this study. This finding does not confirm the premise of the situational crisis
communications theory and, therefore, does not add to the validity of the theory.
H2, which states that in an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational
response message will produce a more positive perception of crisis responsibility for an
organization than an unmatched organizational response strategy, was not supported by
the results of this study. Although not supported, this was the only hypothesis that
suggested slight support for the matched response. It was not a significant amount;
however, there was opportunity that, with more research, it significant results could
possibly emerge. Per the results, this finding does not confirm the premise of the
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situational crisis communications theory and, therefore does not add to the validity of the
theory.
H3, which states that in an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational
response message will produce a more positive potential supportive behavior than an
unmatched organizational response strategy. This finding does not confirm the premise
of the situational crisis communications theory and, therefore, does not add to the validity
of the theory.
It was hypothesized that in an accident crisis situation, a matched organizational
response message will produce a more positive perception of organizational reputation,
crisis responsibility, and potential supportive behavior than an unmatched organizational
response strategy. All hypotheses were not supported by the results of the study.
It should also be discussed, the item that the alpha indicated that should be
dropped from organizational reputation to give a better scale reliability. By dropping the
item “I intend to call or email my state government officials to voice my concern on this
crisis that is affecting USF,” a better coefficient was achieved. With all other responses
suggesting low involvement from the participants, what provoked the students to want to
go above and beyond to contact the government?
When all previous studies on the SCCT indicate that a particular result should
occur, but the results come back inconclusive, it must be taken into consideration that
there were unfactored variables that were not considered while conducting the study.
The first variable that should be discussed is the lack of apathy from the
participants. The study did not take the participants presumptive opinion about USF into
consideration which could have made the study clearer to why the participants answered

58

the questions in the manner that they did. Knowing the participants presumptive opinion
about USF is a key factor in this study because each stakeholder’s view on an
organization varies and some of the participants in the study could have had a
predisposed opinion that did not favor USF which may have caused heavily opinionated
responses that ultimately proved every hypothesis inconclusive.
The next variable up for discussion is low involvement from participants. This
should not be ruled out for the cause of insignificant data because it could simply be that
the participants did not care to be highly involved in the study because, even though the
crisis was purely hypothetical, it did not affect their academic plans and if the study had
nothing to do with them, then it is very clear to see why the participants would not be as
involved in something that did not have a direct affect on their academic careers.
Besides the prediction of low involvement from the participants, a valid limitation
on the results that is beyond the researcher’s control could stem from the fact that the
participants were part of a large class that is constantly saturated with surveys and
experiments from graduate students because the class produces a large number for a
diverse outcome of results.
Another factor that was discovered while analyzing the results was that too much
information was disseminated before the actual experiment was administered. The
participants of the study were alerted that the crisis in the experiment was purely
hypothetical even before the participants received the survey to complete. With this
major factor, it should be made aware that the results of this study should be assessed
skeptically and that this could be one of the main reasons why the results came out the
way they did.
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Although the results from the study did not produce significance that was
supposed to further validate the SCCT, a more significant discovery was found that is
more important than if this study actually furthered SCCT’s validation. While trying to
group a hypothetical crisis with USF in the center, it was very difficult to categorize the
crisis type because the crisis types list did not accommodate the type of crisis that may
occur at an educational institution or organization of the sort. This is crucial to the SCCT
because if it were an actual implemented theory, it would be very difficult for a crisis
manager to craft an effective response for a crisis type that does not have a category.
As described on page 25, it would appear that a hypothetical crisis of this caliber
would fit in organizational misdeed with no injuries, organizational misdeed management
misconduct, or challenges. However, if examined closer, in a crisis like this;
stakeholders are never deceived, laws or regulations are not violated by management
(administration), and the educational institution is not operating in an inappropriate
manner no matter the responsibility acceptance level. If this crisis did not fit any of the
predisposed crisis types, then it must be concluded that another crisis type and/or a more
detailed description must be added to accommodate this type of crisis.
Future Research
Research should begin to assess how crisis types are perceived. Through the
scant research on the SCCT are researchers paying enough attention to make sure that
there is a category for every type of possible crisis? Because my study was a
hypothetical crisis that could severely affect the educational institution’s stakeholders and
it did not fit any of the 13 different types of crises. If there is not room for a crisis type of
this caliber, then one must be conjured because all assumptions in crisis management
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must be accurate if these assumptions are being used to recommend plans of action for
crisis managers.
Conclusion
Despite limitations, the present study offers some insight on the effect of a crisis
on perceptions organizations involved in crisis. It is important that the SCCT be tested to
build reliable social science and to contribute to the constant changing and developing of
crisis communication management. Results from this study do not support the SCCT in
validating that a matched response is more effective than an unmatched response.
However, it should be taken into serious account that if this study were to be duplicated
and all limitations were covered and/or corrected, the results would support the SCCT
which will provide more information to crisis managers in crafting more strategic
messages that will more effectively protect an organization’s reputation.
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